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Abstract When multiplicative noises are used to protect a sensitive attribute of records in a
microdata, it is frequently assumed that data intruders use the noise-multiplied value to estimate
the corresponding unobservable original value of a target record. In this paper, we show that,
data intruders could use another estimate instead of using the noise-multiplied value to attack an
original value. The new estimate, namely correlation-attack estimate, is obtained by exploiting
the potentially high correlation between the noise-multiplied data and the original data. We
provide a detailed comparison between the two estimates (noise-multiplied value and correlationattack estimate) by comparing the mean square errors of the two underlying estimators, and we
propose that data providers should always assess the disclosure risks from both estimators when
generating noise-multiplied data. Correspondingly, we propose a disclosure risk measure which
could be used by data providers for noise generating variable selection during data masking stage.
A simulation study is provided to illustrate how the disclosure risk measure could be used.
Keywords Data Confidentiality · Noise Multiplication Masking · Continuous Microdata ·
Disclosure Risk · Attacking Strategy

1 Introduction
Microdata contains details of individuals or businesses across several attributes, such as personal
income. The role of a data provider may involve collecting and releasing microdata to data users
for analysis. When carrying out this role, the data provider needs to ensure that the released
data carries enough information about the population, while private information of the survey
respondents are not revealed to the public. To satisfy both requirements, the data provider may
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apply data perturbation techniques to produce a set of perturbed microdata, and release the
perturbed microdata to the public. This paper considers the case of using multiplicative noises
to perturb the original data, and the resulted noise-multiplied data is released to the public for
analysis (Hwang 1986; Evans 1996; Kim and Winkler 2003; Nayak et al. 2011; Sinha et al. 2011).
Using multiplicative noises to perturb sensitive values has been advocated by many researchers
because of its appealing features. Multiplicative noises provide uniform protections, in terms of
the coefficient of variation of the noises, to all sensitive observations (Nayak et al. 2011) and
are more suitable for economic modeling of income data (Kim and Winkler 2003). The masking
mechanism is easy to implement in practice and a balanced utility-risk tradeoff is achieved by
selecting an appropriate noise generating variable, which is referred to as “tuning mechanism”
in Klein et al. (2014). The masking method has also been used in practice by the U.S. Energy
Information Administration and the U.S. Bureau of Census (Kim and Jeong 2008).
When multiplicative noises are used to perturb a sensitive attribute, the data provider uses
a noise generating variable C to produce noise terms. The data provider releases the noisemultiplied data together with some extra information of C to the public. Methodologies for
analysing noise-multiplied data have been developed by taking into account the information of
C so that statistical properties of the population could be recovered from the noise-multiplied
microdata (Kim and Winkler 2003; Nayak et al. 2011; Sinha et al. 2011; Lin and Wise 2012;
Klein et al. 2014).
It is important for data providers to understand the disclosure risk of releasing noise-multiplied
microdata to the public. Disclosure occurs if the private information of a target record is learned
by a data intruder. For a numeric private value (such as personal income), even if it is protected
by a multiplicative noise, disclosure could still occur if the original value is reasonably inferred
by a data intruder. This type of disclosure is called value disclosure or predictive disclosure
(Nayak et al. 2011). Understanding all potential disclosure risks is important as it could help
data providers to take precautions when generating perturbed data. However, as noted in Nayak
et al. (2011), evaluating value disclosure risk is difficult because different data intruders may have
different target values as well as different prior knowledge about the original data. To understand
potential disclosure risks of a data masking mechanism, a common approach in the literature is
to model intrusion behaviors (Agrawal and Srikant 2000; Domingo-Ferrer et al. 2004; Liu et al.
2008; Ma et al. 2016). Correspondingly, appropriate actions could be made during data masking
stage such that the released data is protected against these behaviours.
Under the context of multiplicative noise perturbation, some intrusion behaviours have also
been modelled under specific contexts. For instance, Nayak et al. (2011) considered the scenario
that multiplicative noises are used to perturb contributor values of a tabular data, and modelled
an intrusion behaviour for disclosing a target contributor value of a table cell. In terms of using
multiplicative noises to perturb microdata, Klein et al. (2014) considered the scenario where a
response variable is sensitive and masked by multiplicative noises while explanatory variables are
unmasked. The authors showed that a data intruder may use the predicted value based on the
generalised regression model to estimate a private original value. Another intrusion behaviour is
recognised in Nayak et al. (2011) and Lin and Wise (2012), that the data provider may simply use
the noise-multiplied value as an estimate of an original value because the noise-multiplied value is
in fact an unbiased estimate of the original value. This fact is also recognised in Kim (2007) and
Kim and Jeong (2008) and these authors proposed several noise distributions in order to reduce
the disclosure risk. Corresponding disclosure risk measures against these intrusion behaviours
were proposed in Klein et al. (2014) and Lin and Wise (2012) so that data providers could
control the disclosure risks by choosing a suitable noise candidate during data masking stage.
This paper considers another intrusion behaviour for attacking noise-multiplied data. Similar to the intrusion behaviour recognised in Nayak et al. (2011) and Lin and Wise (2012), the
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intrusion behaviour we consider in this paper only uses information of the noise-multiplied attribute itself. Because of its simplicity, the attacking strategy could always be used as an attempt
to unveil a noise-multiplied value. The attacking strategy exploits the correlation between the
original data and the noise-multiplied data, therefore we name it as “correlation-attack”. The
intuition behind the correlation-attack is that if the correlation between the original data and
the noise-multiplied data is high, then a simple linear regression model might be adequate to
explain the relationship between the two sets of data. The correlation between the original data
and the noise-multiplied data could be reasonably estimated by a data intruder, as we show in
Section 3. On the basis of the mean squared errors (MSEs), both the unbiased estimator and the
correlation-attack estimator tend to be more accurate as the correlation gets larger. Therefore, a
high correlation value might motivate a data intruder to use either the unbiased estimate or the
correlation-attack estimate to disclose a target value. Correspondingly, we propose a disclosure
risk measure to be used by data providers, so that for each original value, the disclosure risks
from both estimators could be simultaneously evaluated. The disclosure risk measure could help
data providers with noise generating variable selection during data masking stage. A simulation
study is provided to illustrate the use of the disclosure risk measure.
The idea of using regression models to attack private values has also been considered for
k-anonymized data (Li and Sarkar 2011). The authors considered the possibility of using a regression tree to attack a protected value of a target record. By treating the target anonymized
attribute as the response variable and other anonymized attributes as explanatory variables,
the authors showed that it is possible to reveal the private information of a target record. The
authors referred to this attack as “regression-attack”. The regression-attack is similar to the
idea of using the predicted value based on a generalised linear regression model to attack a
noise-multiplied value proposed in Klein et al. (2014). We feel that the major difference between
the regression-attack and our correlation-attack is that the correlation-attack only uses information of the noise-multiplied attribute itself to attack a noise-multiplied value. That is, the
regressors of a regression-attack could involve other confidentialised attributes in a microdata,
while the regressor of a correlation-attack is simply the confidentialised attribute itself, or the
noise-multiplied attribute in our context. We note that when several attributes in a microdata
are protected by multiplicative noises, the idea of the regression-attack might be used to attack
a particular noise-multiplied value. In that case, the regressors of an attacking regression model
are some or all attributes (either noise-multiplied or not) in the microdata. This idea could be
explored in the future.
Throughout this paper, we assume all original data and noise candidates are positive and
continuous, and all noise candidates have expectation 1. The sample size of the original data
is large enough so that estimates of some population parameters could be accurately recovered.
We assume the following simple scenario: the data provider releases the noise-multiplied data
together with the variance of the noise generating variable used to perturb a set of original data
to the public, so that data users could unbiasedly recover the first two moments estimates of
the population (such as population mean and variance) from the noise-multiplied data. We note
that assuming preservation of the first two moments estimates only is consistent with many
other masking schemes in the literature (Brand 2002; Yancey et al. 2002; Kim and Winkler
2003; Domingo-Ferrer et al. 2004; Oganian and Karr 2011). For instance, the data perturbation
method proposed in Oganian and Karr (2011) only allows data users to obtain unbiased estimates of population means and covariance matrix from perturbed microdata. The assumption
simplifies discussions of this paper especially when we define overall data utility loss. Sophisticated methodologies for analysing noise-multiplied data require the density functions of noise
generating variables to be public (Sinha et al.2011; Klein et al. 2014; Lin 2014; Lin and Fielding
2015), so that more population information could be recovered from noise-multiplied data. The
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correlation-attack proposed in this paper could also be used under these situations where density
functions of noises are public.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the mathematically setup of the noise
multiplication masking method and review methodologies for recovering the first two moments
estimates of a population from noise-multiplied data. Section 3 introduces the correlation-attack
strategy. Section 4 discusses and compares the correlation-attack estimator and the unbiased
estimator. Section 5 proposes a disclosure risk measure which could used by data providers for
noise candidates selection and introduces the definition of overall data utility loss we adopt in
this paper. Section 6 presents a simulation study. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2 Recovering the first two moments population estimates from noise-multiplied
data
In this section we describe the mathematical setup of noise multiplication masking method and
review methodologies proposed in Nayak et al. (2011) for recovering the first two moments estimates (first two moments and variance) of a population from a set of noise-multiplied data. For
a set of univariate original data, the noise multiplication masking method works as follows:
Suppose a set of original data y = {yi }ni=1 are independent realizations from Y . To mask y, the
data provider chooses a noise generating variable C with E(C) = 1. Y and C are independent. A
set of noise terms c = {ci }ni=1 are independently drawn from C and multiplied with y to produce
the noise-multiplied data y ∗ = {yi∗ }ni=1 = {yi ci }ni=1 . {yi∗ }ni=1 could be treated as independent realizations from Y ∗ , where Y ∗ = Y C. The data provider releases y ∗ together with other information
2
or density function fC ) to the public. Following Kim and Winkler
of C (such as variance σC
2
(2003) and Lin and Wise (2012), throughout this paper we assume a simple case where only σC
is released to the public.
2
If σC
is pubic, Nayak et al. (2011) showed that the first two moments of Y could be unbiasedly
recovered from Y ∗ . That is

E(Y ) = E(Y ∗ )
and
E(Y 2 ) =

E[(Y ∗ )2 ]
E[(Y ∗ )2 ]
= 2
.
2
E(C )
(σC + 1)

Denote E(Y ) = µY and V ar(Y ) = σY2 . The authors also showed that, µY and σY2 could be
unbiasedly estimated by µ̂Y and σ̂Y2 using y ∗ , where
Pn
µ̂Y =

i=1

yi∗

n

(1)

and
σ̂Y2 =

n
n
2 X
X
1
n + σC
[(
)
(yi∗ )2 − (
yi∗ )2 ].
2
n(n − 1) 1 + σC i=1
i=1

(2)

2
In summary, when σC
is public, data users could unbiasedly recover estimates of the first two
moments and variance of Y . However, it is not true for other information of Y , such as quantiles
and higher order moments as recovering these information requires fC to be public.
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3 The correlation-attack strategy
In this section we introduce the correlation-attack strategy which could be used by a data intruder
to obtain an estimate of an unobservable original value yi . The correlation-attack follows from the
idea that, if the sample correlation between y ∗ and y is high, then a simple linear regression model
may adequately explains the relationship between y and y ∗ . Consequently, the data intruder could
use the predicted value based on the simple linear regression model to estimate a target original
value yi from yi∗ .
From the data intruder’s perspective, the original data y is unobservable. Therefore, the
sample correlation between y and y ∗ , denoted as ryy∗ , cannot be known. However, when the
sample size n is large, ryy∗ is close to ρY Y ∗ , where ρY Y ∗ is the population correlation coefficient
between Y and Y ∗ . It can be shown that ρY Y ∗ takes the following form:
s
s
σY2
V ar(Y )
Cov(Y ∗ , Y )
(3)
=
=
ρY Y ∗ = p
2
2
2
∗
V ar(Y )
σY (σC + 1) + µ2Y σC
V ar(Y ∗ )V ar(Y )
In the above expression, the knowledge of µY and σY2 is unknown. However, the data intruder
could unbiasedly estimate these two terms from y ∗ by µ̂Y and σ̂Y2 using Equation (1) and (2).
Therefore, ρY Y ∗ could be approximated by r̃yy∗ , where
s
σ̂Y2
r̃yy∗ =
(4)
2
2
2 .
σ̂Y (σC + 1) + µ̂2Y σC
As a result, if the sample size n is large, then r̃yy∗ could be used to approximate the sample
correlation ryy∗ . If r̃yy∗ is large, then it might motivate the data intruder to fit a simple linear
regression model between y and y ∗ , and to use the predicted value based on the linear model to
attack the unobservable yi . The predicted value of yi based on yi∗ has the following expression:
ŷi = α̂ + β̂yi∗ ,
where α̂ and β̂ are least squares estimates of the intercept and slope terms. The estimates can
s
be evaluated as follows: β̂ = ryy∗ syy∗ and α̂ = ȳ − β̂y ∗ , where sy and sy∗ are sample variances of
y and y ∗ , respectively; ȳ and y ∗ are sample means of y and y ∗ , respectively.
For the data intruder, ȳ, sy and ryy∗ cannot be known directly as y is not available. Therefore
α̂ and β̂ cannot be obtained directly. However, when the sample size n is large, ȳ is close to µY ,
sy is close to σY , and ryy∗ is close to ρY Y ∗ . The values (µY , σY , ρY Y ∗ ) could be approximated
from y ∗ by (µ̂Y , σ̂Y , r̃yy∗ ) using Equation (1), (2) and (4). Therefore, the unknown quantities ȳ,
sy and ryy∗ could be approximated by µ̂Y , σ̂Y and r̃yy∗ respectively. As a result, the least squares
estimates α̂ and β̂ could be approximated by α̃ and β̃, where β̃ = r̃yy∗ sσ̂yY∗ and α̃ = (1−r̃yy∗ sσ̂yY∗ )y ∗ .
Therefore, the correlation-attack estimate ỹi which could be obtained by the data intruder to
attack yi takes the following form:
ỹi = α̃ + β̃yi∗ = (1 − r̃yy∗

σ̂Y ∗
σ̂Y ∗
)y + r̃yy∗
y .
sy∗
sy∗ i

4 Comparison between Yi∗ and Ỹi and discussion
In this section we discuss and compare the accuracies of the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi and
the unbiased estimator Yi∗ for estimating a target value yi . We compare the two estimators
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because both ỹi and yi∗ could easily be obtained by a data intruder given basic knowledge of
2
y ∗ and σC
to attack yi . Because of the generality, we propose that the disclosure risks from
both estimators should always be evaluated and controlled for most noise-multiplied data. To
understand both estimators, we base our discussion on the mean squared errors (MSE) of these
estimators.
From the last section, we introduced the correlation-attack estimate ỹi . We denote the
correlation-attack estimator as Ỹi . The mathematically expression of Ỹi cannot be easily found
without making a large sample assumption. By noting that when sample size is large, r̃yy∗ sσ̂yY∗ is
close to ρY Y ∗ σσYY∗ = ρ2Y Y ∗ , and y ∗ is close to µY . Then, Ỹi is approximated to be the following
Ỹi ≈ (1 − ρ2Y Y ∗ )µY + ρ2Y Y ∗ Yi∗ .
We use this expression of Ỹi for discussion throughout this section. On the other hand, the
unbiased estimator Yi∗ is simply the noise multiplied variable and Yi∗ = Yi Ci . It is an unbiased
estimator because E(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) = yi . It can be seen directly that Ỹi is partially determined by
Yi∗ . The MSE of the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi is given as:
2
M SE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) = E[(1−ρ2Y Y ∗ )µY +ρ2Y Y ∗ CYi −Yi |Yi = yi ]2 = (1−ρ2Y Y ∗ )2 (µY −yi )2 +ρ4Y Y ∗ yi2 σC
.

The MSE of the unbiased estimator Yi∗ is given as:
2
M SE(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) = E(CYi − Yi |Yi = yi )2 = yi2 E(C − 1)2 = yi2 σC
.

2
=
Accuracies of Ỹi and Yi∗ : We first note that from Equation (3), σC
2
σC

1−ρ2Y Y ∗
2 ).
ρ2Y Y ∗ (1+µ2Y /σY

Because

monotonically decreases as ρY Y ∗ increases. The MSEs of both estiρY Y ∗ ∈ [0, 1], therefore
2
decreases, meaning that they are more accurate for estimating yi as ρY Y ∗
mators decrease as σC
gets larger. It is straightforward to see it for Yi∗ based on its MSE. However, it is not straight2
by
forward to see it for Ỹi . To show this, we substitute σC

1−ρ2Y Y ∗
2 )
ρ2Y Y ∗ (1+µ2Y /σY

in the expression of

M SE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ), so we have
M SE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) = (k1 − k2 )ρ4Y Y ∗ + (k2 − 2k1 )ρ2Y Y ∗ + k1 ,
y2

i
, h = µ2Y /σY2 . So the MSE is a parabola in terms of ρ2Y Y ∗ . The
where k1 = (µY − yi )2 , k2 = 1+h
k2
symmetric axis is S = 1 + 2(k1 −k2 ) . The parabola is monotonically decreasing in ρ2Y Y ∗ ∈ [0, 1]

in almost all cases, meaning that the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi is more accurate as ρY Y ∗
increases. The only exception is when k2 > 2k1 . Under this condition, the symmetric axis
√ S is
2µ (1+h)−µ

2(1+h)

Y
,
within [0,1] so the function is not monotone in [0,1]. That means when yi ∈ ( Y
1+2h
√
2µY (1+h)+µY 2(1+h)
), M SE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) will increase first as ρ2Y Y ∗ goes from 0 to S, but it
1+2h
eventually decreases to 0 as ρ2Y Y ∗ increases from S to 1. Therefore, both estimators are more
accurate as ρY Y ∗ gets larger. A large ρY Y ∗ value might motivate a data intruder to use either
the unbiased estimator or the correlation-attack estimator to attack yi .
Comparison between Ỹi and Yi∗ :An estimator predicts the unknown value better if it yields
a smaller MSE. To compare which estimator predicts yi better, we set M SE(Ỹi |Yi = yi ) −
M SE(Yi∗ |Yi = yi ) < 0. Those conditions which satisfy this inequality mean that under the
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conditions, the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi predicts yi with better accuracy. After solving the
inequality, we let
p
σY2 − σY σY2 + µ2Y
,
a=
µ2Y
p
σ 2 + σY σY2 + µ2Y
b= Y
,
µ2Y
p
µY ρ2Y Y ∗ (σY2 + µ2Y ) − µY σY ρY Y ∗ (1 + ρ2Y Y ∗ )(σY2 + µ2Y )
c=
ρ2Y Y ∗ µ2Y − σY2
p
µY ρ2Y Y ∗ (σY2 + µ2Y ) + µY σY ρY Y ∗ (1 + ρ2Y Y ∗ )(σY2 + µ2Y )
,
d=
ρ2Y Y ∗ µ2Y − σY2
e = min(c, d) and f = max(c, d), then we have the following result:
Result 1:Based on MSEs, for large-sized sample, when ρY Y ∗ < a or ρY Y ∗ > b, an observation
yi is more vulnerable to Ỹi if yi ∈ (e, f ); when ρY Y ∗ ∈ (a, b), yi is more vulnerable to Ỹi if yi < e
or yi > f ; when ρY Y ∗ equals a or b, yi is more vulnerable to Ỹi if yi > µY /2.
Based on Result 1, we have the following discussions from both the data intruder and the
data provider’s perspectives:
Discussion 1 : If ρY Y ∗ is high, then the data intruder may use either the correlation-attack
estimator or the unbiased estimator to attack a target value yi . The values of (a, b, e, f ) depend
on three parameters (µY , σY , ρY Y ∗ ). From the data intruder’s perspective, these parameters could
easily be estimated from y ∗ using Equations (1), (2)and (4). Therefore, the data intruder could
obtain estimates (â, b̂, ê, fˆ), and use Result 1 to make a decision on which particular estimator
should be used for attacking yi . In order to do this, the data intruder needs to make an initial
guess about the location of yi in terms of (ê, fˆ). For instance, if the data intruder’s estimate r̃yy∗
is within (â, b̂), and the data intruder has a strong belief that yi is greater than fˆ, then logically
speaking the data intruder would use the correlation-attack estimate to attack the value of yi .
In the simulation study in Section 6, it can be shown that original values over 26317.6 are more
vulnerable to the correlation-attack estimator according to Result 1. If a noise-multiplied value is
significantly greater than 26317.6, say 200000, it is unlikely that the corresponding original value
is less than 26317.6. Therefore, it is very likely that the data intruder uses the correlation-attack
estimator to attack this value.
Alternatively, if a data intruder has no prior knowledge about the location of the unobservable
yi and only assumes yi ∼ Yi , one possible choice is that the data intruder may attempt to
compute the expected location of yi by E(Yi |Yi∗ = yi∗ ) = yi∗ E( C1 ), and make a decision about
which estimator to use according to this value. The exact value of E( C1 ) could only be known if
2
the density function fC is public. Because we only assume σC
is public, E( C1 ) cannot be known.
However, it is commonly assumed in the literature that noise generating variables are symmetric
and positive. Under this assumption, the support of C will be a subset of [0, 2] and
E(

1
) = lim
→0
C

Z


2−

1
fC (c)dc = lim
→0
c

Z


1

1
1
( +
)fC (c)dc ≥ 2
c 2−c

Z

1

fC (c)dc ≥ 1,


which means E(Yi |Yi∗ = yi∗ ) = yi∗ E( C1 ) ≥ yi∗ . Thus, the data intruder could have a rough idea
about the expected location of yi based on yi∗ , and make a decision about which estimator to use
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according to this information and Result 1. In summary, the data intruder may use either Yi∗ or
Ỹi to attack the unobservable yi according to Result 1.
Discussion 2 : From the data provider’s perspective, the above result means that the correlationattack estimator Ỹi could yield a higher disclosure risk than the unbiased estimator Yi∗ for some
yi and vice versa. To protect all observations, the safest way is to make sure that for each original value yi , the disclosure risks from both estimators are simultaneously below an acceptable
level. In that way, all original observations could be protected regardless of the data intruder’s
attacking strategy.
In the next section, we propose a disclosure risk measure which could be used by data providers
to measure disclosure risks against these two estimators simultaneously. The proposed disclosure
risk measure could help data providers with noise generating variable selection during data
masking stage.

5 Disclosure risk and data utility loss measures
For noise multiplication masking method, the noise generating variable C plays the role of balancing data utility loss and disclosure risk, or “tuning mechanism” in Klein et al. (2014). That
is, for a set of original data, the data provider needs to decide on an appropriate noise generating
variable which achieves the required utility-risk tradeoff. In this section we introduce our definition of disclosure risk and propose a disclosure risk measure to be used by data providers
for noise generating variable selection in practice. We also introduce the definition of overall
data utility loss we use in this paper
Disclosure occurs if a data intruder successfully identified a target record in the microdata,
and learned a private value of the identified record. That requires both identity disclosure and
value disclosure to occur at the same time. Identity disclosure occurs if a data intruder successfully identified a record through a set of quasi-identifiers (Li and Sarkar 2013), or through
record-linkage techniques (Kim and Winkler 1995; Oganyan and Karr 2011). Identity disclosure
risk could be reduced by certain masking techniques, such as k-anonymity (Li and Sarkar 2013).
The noise multiplication masking method could reduce identification rate caused by recordlinkage techniques (Muralidhar and Domingo-Ferrer 2016). However, it may not reduce identity
disclosure risk caused by quasi-identifiers, especially that some quasi-identifiers are non-numeric
and cannot be protected by multiplicative noises. Therefore, given a noise-multiplied microdata,
we may not know which records might be identified by data intruders. In this paper, we conservatively assume that all records are vulnerable to identity disclosure. Therefore, our focus is to
reduce value disclosure risk (or predictive disclosure in Nayak et al. 2011). A low value disclosure
risk means that even if a record is being identified by a data intruder, the private information
associated with the record could not be confidently learned by the data intruder because it is
protected by a multiplicative noise. Value disclosure occurs if a data intruder’s estimate of a
target original value is close to the real value. Following Lin and Wise (2012), Klein et al. (2014)
and Ma et al. (2016), we define “disclosure” in the following way:
To estimate a target value yi (positive and continuous), a data intruder may use his own attacking strategy to obtain an estimate ŷi . To classify ŷi as a good estimate of yi , it is sufficient for ŷi
i
| < δ, where δ is called acceptance
to be reasonably close to yi . Disclosure of yi occurs if | ŷiy−y
i
rule in Lin and Wise (2012) and is a small positive number. For instance, if δ = 0.05, we say
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that ŷi discloses yi if 0.95yi < ŷi < 1.05yi .
Different measures for quantifying value disclosure risk of yi have been proposed in the literature, with the assumption that the unbiased estimator Yi∗ is used for disclosing the original
value. For instance, Nayak et al. (2011) introduced a confidence interval measure to quantify the
disclosure risk. Specifically, let [a1 , b1 ] be the shortest interval satisfying P (a1 < Ci < b1 ) = 1−α,
where α is a positive number. So the 100(1 − α) confidence interval of yi is (yi∗ /b1 , yi∗ /a1 ), which
is used to measure the disclosure risk of yi . A similar measure is used in Agrawal and Srikant
(2000) under the context of additive noise masking. Another measure proposed in Lin and Wise
(2012) calculates the probability of yi being disclosed by Yi∗ , which is given by
RLW (Yi∗ , δ|Yi = yi ) = P (|

Yi∗ − yi
| < δ) = P (|C − 1| < δ).
yi

(5)

We propose to use the probabilistic disclosure risk measure because it is straight-forward and
could easily be modified to measure disclosure risks from other estimators. For instance, Klein
et al. (2014) proposed a similar probabilistic disclosure risk measure by replacing Yi∗ by a linear
predictor based on a regression model. Following this idea, we propose a disclosure risk measure
Rρ (yi , δ|Yi = yi ) to evaluate the disclosure risk of yi being disclosed by the correlation-attack
estimator Ỹi . That is:
Ỹi − yi
| < δ).
(6)
Rρ (Ỹi , δ|Yi = yi ) = P (|
yi
As the exact form of Ỹi is not straight-forward to show, Rρ cannot be computed exactly. For
large-sized sample, we propose two approaches for data providers to estimate Rρ in practice.
Approach 1: The data provider may just assume that Ỹi ≈ (1 − ρ2Y Y ∗ )µY + ρ2Y Y ∗ Yi∗ as in Sec(−δ+1)y −(1−ρ2

)µ

(δ+1)y −(1−ρ2

)µ

i
i
Y
Y
YY∗
YY∗
tion 4. Then, we have Rρ (Ỹi , δ|Yi = yi ) ≈ P (
<C <
).
ρ2Y Y ∗ yi
ρ2Y Y ∗ yi
In this expression, the parameters µY and ρY Y ∗ are not known to the data provider but they
could be estimated using sample estimates obtained from the original data. That is, µY could be
estimated by the sample mean of the original data, and the parameter ρY Y ∗ could be estimated
by plugging in sample estimates of µY and σY2 calculated from the original data into Equation
(??). The data provider could then use the approximated disclosure risk measure to estimate
Rρ . Our simulations showed that for large-sized sample, e.g. sample size greater than 1000, the
approximates of Rρ are very close to the theoretical values for each yi .

Approach 2: The data provider could use Monte-Carlo simulations to approximate Rρ . That is,
the data provider could firstly produce N multiple copies of noise-multiplied data using the noise
candidate C, and then perform the correlation-attack by assuming the role of a data intruder.
The correlation-attack is applied on each copy of the noise-multiplied data following the steps
described in Section 3. To estimate Rρ , suppose among the N copies, in q of them yi is disclosed
by the corresponding correlation-attack estimate. Then Rρ (Ỹi , δ|Yi = yi ) is estimated to be q/N .
Hereafter, we use RLW (yi , δ) to denote RLW (Yi∗ , δ|Yi = yi ) etc. We use Rcor (yi , δ) to denote
an approximate of Rρ (yi , δ) regardless of which approach the data provider uses to estimate
Rρ (yi , δ). From the last section, we have shown that some original observations are more vulnerable to the correlation-attack estimator while the others are more vulnerable to the unbiased
estimator. We note that even though Result 1 provides a guidance about which estimator is more
effective for predicting each yi , it is calculated based on MSEs. Under the probabilistic disclosure
risk measure we proposed, our simulation results with different sets of synthetic data show that

10

Yue Ma, Yan-Xia Lin, Rathin Sarathy

an estimator with a lower MSE does not always result in a larger disclosure risk. Therefore, to
protect yi , the safest way is to make sure that the disclosure risks from both estimators are simultaneously below an acceptable level. In that way, we say that yi is protected regardless of the
data intruder’s attacking strategy. We propose the following disclosure risk measure to evaluate
the disclosure risk for each yi :
R(yi , δ) = max{RLW (yi , δ), Rcor (yi , δ)}

(7)

A sufficiently low R(yi , δ) value means that yi is protected against both the correlation-attack
estimator and the unbiased estimator. For a set of original data {yi }ni=1 and a noise candidate
C, the data provider collects a set of disclosure risks {R(yi , δ)}ni=1 for each yi . The data provider
could use the set of disclosure risks as a reference for noise candidate selection. In some cases, it
might be sufficient to say that a noise candidate offers an acceptable level of protection to the
original data if the average value {R(yi , δ)}ni=1 is below a threshold value. In some other cases
where all observations are highly sensitive, the data provider may require max({R(yi , δ)}ni=1 ) to
be sufficiently low in order for a noise candidate to be considered. The data provider might need
to determine a criteria for disclosure risk control according to the nature of the original data.
We will provide an example in the simulation study.
We note that the disclosure risk measure is designed for the data provider to understand the
disclosure risk of using a noise candidate C to mask the original data. For the data intruder,
he/she may rely on Discussion 1 to determine which attacking estimator to use, but the intruder
cannot use the disclosure risk measure to evaluate the probability of successfully disclosing yi
using either Yi∗ or Ỹi . We also note that a low R(yi , δ) value guarantees that yi is protected against
both the unbiased estimator Yi∗ and the correlation-attack estimator Ỹi . However, we may not
say that yi has a low disclosure risk because of other possible attacking strategies. When yi is
subject to other disclosure risks, the data provider might need to consider using R(yi , δ) together
with other disclosure risk measures to jointly determine a suitable noise generating variable.
Because the unbiased estimator and the correlation-attack estimator are two basic attacking
estimators, we feel that a noise candidate should at least guarantee that the noise-multiplied
data is protected against these two attacking estimators first in order for the noise candidate to
be considered further for masking a set of original data.
2
2
cannot be too large as
is larger, σC
Even though the original data is better protected if σC
doing so may significantly reduce the analytical validity of the noise-multiplied data, or data
utility. When recovering a population parameter estimate from the noise-multiplied data, the
recovered parameter estimate is less accurate than the one data users would obtain by analysing
the original data. Data utility loss measures such loss of accuracy for a population parameter. In
the following we name the recovered parameter estimates from noise-multiplied data as perturbed
estimates, and the estimates obtained by analysing the original data as unperturbed estimates.
An overall data utility loss is an aggregate measure of the utility losses across several parameters. In the remaining of this section, we introduce the overall data utility loss measure we use
in this paper.
There is no unique way to measure overall data utility loss. In the literature, the way of
measuring overall data utility loss varies according to different data masking scenarios as well
as which parameters estimates could be recovered from masked data. For instance, Yancey et
al. (2002) proposed to use the average of relative distances between perturbed estimates and
unperturbed estimates across several parameters as an overall data utility loss measure under the
context of additive-noise perturbation. Those parameters include population means, covariances
and correlations, as those parameter estimates could be accurately recovered from noise-added
microdata. Other overall utility loss measures are available, see Shlomo (2010), Domingo-Ferrer
and Torra (2001) and Agrawal and Aggarwal (2001).
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Duncan et al. (2001; 2004) proposed to use a data user’s mean squared error in estimating
a population parameter from perturbed data as a way to measure utility loss. We note that,
2
when noise-multiplied data y ∗ and noise variance σC
are released to the public, data users could
only recover the first two moments estimates, such as population mean and variance, from y ∗ .
Calculating these estimates requires estimates of the first two moments of Y . In this paper, we
assume a simple case that the overall utility loss measure is computed according to utility losses
of E(Y ) and E(Y 2 ) only. We note that similar cases for measuring overall utility loss have also
been considered in the literature (Kim and Winkler 1995, 2003; Brand 2002; Yancey et al. 2002;
Oganian and Karr 2011) . For instance, Kim and Winkler (1995) only considered utility losses
for population mean and variance as indications of overall utility loss for noise-added microdata.
In the following we introduce the overall utility loss measure we use in this paper. From Section
∗ 2
) ]
. Therefore, E(Y ) could be unbiasedly estimated by data
2, E(Y ) = E(Y ∗ ) and E(Y 2 ) = E[(Y
(σ 2 +1)
Pn

Y∗

C

i
users using UY = i=1
, and E(Y 2 ) could be unbiasedly estimated using UY 2 =
n
Based on Duncan et al (2001; 2004)’s utility loss measure, we have the following:

U L1 = V ar(UY |{yi }ni=1 ) =

2
σC

Pn

i=1
n2

∗ 2
i=1 (Yi )
2 +1) .
n(σC

Pn

yi2

and
U L2 = V ar(UY 2 |{yi }ni=1 ) =

2
[E(C 4 ) − (σC
+ 1)2 ]
2
2
n (σC + 1)2

Pn

i=1

yi4

The expression of U L1 means that, a set of noise candidates with equal variance will result in
the same level of data utility loss for E(Y ). As a result, in this paper we use the following overall
utility loss measure: When selecting among a set of noise candidates, we let the variances of
these noise candidates to be equal. Then, we say a noise candidate will result in the lowest level
of overall utility loss if it has the lowest U L2 value.
We note that the overall utility loss measure we use in this paper is simple and is for illustration purpose only. The primary purpose of this paper is the introduction of the proposed
disclosure risk measure. In practice a data provider may use its own overall utility loss measure in
conjunction with the disclosure risk measure we proposed for noise generating variable selection.

6 Simulations
In this section we present a simulation study. We show that our proposed disclosure risk measure
could help a data provider to select an appropriate noise generating variable during data masking
stage. We will use an R-U map (Duncan et al. 2001; 2004) to aid us with decision-makings in the
simulation. We assume that the unbiased estimator and the correlation-attack estimator are the
only sources of disclosure risk. We also comment on the protection levels offered by a few noise
candidates which guarantee that RLW is very small or is 0.
Following Klein et al. (2014), we use the public use data from the 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) March supplement (available from http://www.census.gov/cps/). The entire
data set contains household, family, and individual records. In this paper, we consider positive
household income values under household income attribute as the original data. The original
data contains 50661 positive observations ranging from 1 to 768742, with mean 53007 and variance 2411407246. The data is skewed to the right. In the following we denote the original data
as {yi }50661
i=1 .
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We consider five noise candidates {Ci }5i=1 with equal variance. We aim to use our proposed
disclosure risk and overall utility loss measures to determine the best noise candidate for masking {yi }50661
i=1 . We set the acceptance rule δ = 0.1 throughout this section. Among these noise
candidates, C1 ∼ I1 U1 + (1 − I1p
)U2 , where P (Ip
1 = 0) = P (I1 = 1) = 0.5, U1 ∼ U (0.5, 0.9) and
U2 ∼ U (1.1, 1.5); C2 ∼ U (1−0.5 93/75, 1+0.5 93/75); C3 follows a truncated normal distribution. That is, it follows N (1, 0.146135) which is truncated at 0.3 and 1.7, meaning that C3 has support (0.3, 1.7); C4 ∼ I2 N1 + (1 − I2 )N2 , where P (I2 = 0) = P (I2 = 1) = 0.5, N1 ∼ N (0.7, 4/300)
and N2 ∼ N (1.3, 4/300); C5 ∼ I3 T1 + (1 − I3 )T2 , where P (I3 = 0) = P
q(I3 = 1) = 0.5,

T1 and T2 are triangular random variables with three parameters (1.1 − 9.6
4 , 0.9, 0.9) and
q
(1.1, 1.1, 0.9 + 9.6
4 ) respectively. The distributions of these noise candidates have been proposed or used in the literature for producing noise-multiplied data. Specifically, C1 follows a
double uniform distribution, which was considered in the simulation study in Klein et al. (2014);
C2 follows a uniform distribution, which was proposed and discussed in Sinha et al. (2011); C3
follows a truncated normal distribution, which was considered in Kim and Winkler (2003); C4
follows a bi-modal normal distribution, which was proposed in Lin and Wise (2012); C5 follows a
truncated triangular distribution, which was proposed in Kim (2007) and Kim and Jeong (2008).
Note that C1 , C4 and C5 lead to RLW = 0 for all original observations. Therefore they seem to
be good noise candidates if the unbiased estimator Yi is the only source of disclosure risk for yi .
For C4 , there is a very small probability that it produces a negative noise. We simply ignore this
fact in this simulation because it does not affect the simulation results.
Now we assume the role of the data provider and we aim to find an appropriate noise candidate
to use during data masking stage. We assume the following criteria for disclosure risk control:
a noise candidate needs to guarantee that max({R(yi , δ)}ni=1 ) < 0.3, i.e. the disclosure risk of any
original value is less than 0.3. When multiple noise candidates satisfy the criteria for disclosure
risk control, we say a noise candidate is better than the others if it offers the lowest average
disclosure risk {R(yi , δ)}ni=1 . We use Approach 1 described in Section 5 to estimate Rρ using
Rcor . We also use the overall utility loss measure introduced in Section 5 to compare the
levels of overall utility loss of the noise candidates. That is, since all the noise candidates have
the same variance, a noise candidate with a lower U L2 has a lower level of overall utility loss
under our overall utility loss measure.
The disclosure risk plots of {R(yi , 0.1)}50661
i=1 for all five noise candidates are given in Figure 1.
To comment on the plots, we see that different noise candidates protect original values differently.
For instance, we see that C2 (Figure 1(b)) offers uniform protections to most observations while
the others do not. The noise candidates C1 , C5 , which were previously thought to
be good noise candidates because they guarantee that RLW = 0, are actually not
that ideal when our proposed disclosure risk measure R(yi , δ) is used. For these noise
candidates, R(yi , δ) = Rcor (yi , δ), i.e. the disclosure risk comes entirely from the correlationattack. We see that in this simulation, observations around the sample mean or extremely large
are not protected well by these noise candidates. It may suggest that due to the correlationattack, the merit of those noise candidates with RLW = 0 may need to be reconsidered even if
2
the data intruder may only rely on two pieces of information y ∗ (noise-multiplied data) and σC
(variance of noise) to attack an original value.
and
For each noise candidate, we also considered the average disclosure risk {R(yi , δ)}50661
i=1
the overall level of data utility loss it produces. We use an R-U map to visualize the utility-risk
tradeoffs, which is presented in Figure 2. In the plot, C1 and C4 overlaps, meaning that they
provide similar utility-risk tradeoffs. We see that, the overall data utility loss levels of these noise
candidates are very similar. The average disclosure risks are very low for C1 , C4 and C5 , followed
by C2 and C3 .
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(b) disclosure risk plot for C2 .

(d) disclosure risk plot for C4 .

(e) disclosure risk plot for C5 .

Fig. 1: Disclosure risks {R(yi , 0.1)}50661
plots for each noise candidate.
i=1

Based on all these results, we could make a decision about which noise candidate is appropriate
to use in this context. Based on Figure 1, we see that C1 , C4 and C5 do not satisfy our criteria
for disclosure risk control because they cannot guarantee that every original observation has a
disclosure risk less than 0.3. Therefore, we could only choose between C2 and C3 . From Figure
2, we see that C2 results in a much lower average disclosure risk level than C3 at the expense of
only a slightly higher level of overall data utility loss. As a result, C2 seems to be the best choice
in this context.
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Fig. 2: Utility-Risk tradeoffs of the noise candidates.

7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we showed the correlation-attack which could be used by data intruders to attack
noise-multiplied data. The correlation-attack only uses information of noise-multiplied data itself
and the variance of noise terms, hence could be applied to attack noise-multiplied data in most
situations. Comparison between the correlation-attack estimator and the unbiased estimator
which is another common attacking estimator were made and the result showed that the disclosure
risks from both estimators need to be controlled. Correspondingly, we proposed a disclosure risk
measure for data providers to evaluate the disclosure risks against both attacking estimators
simultaneously for each noise candidate. The proposed disclosure risk measure could be used
with other overall data utility loss measures to help data providers with decision-makings on
noise candidates selection during data masking stage.
For an original value, a noise candidate which results in a low disclosure risk from the unbiased
estimator may not result in a low disclosure risk from the correlation-attack estimator and vice
versa. Similarly, for a set of original data, a noise candidate which produces a low average level
of disclosure risk from the unbiased estimator may produce a high average level of disclosure risk
from the correlation-attack estimator and vice versa. For instance, if the original data follows
LN (5, 0.122 ), we can show that C4 results in a low average level of disclosure risk from the
unbiased estimator (0.0414) but a high average level of disclosure risk from the correlationattack estimator (roughly 0.619). Similarly, we can show that the noise candidate C3 will result
in a very low average level of disclosure risk from the correlation-attack estimator (actually 0)
but a high average level of disclosure risk from the unbiased estimator (0.221). An ideal noise
candidate should protect against both estimators effectively. It might be interesting to find out
these noise candidates given different distributions of original data in the future.
Identifications of other attacking strategies are necessary for disclosure risk control of noisemultiplied microdata. For instance, it may be the case that in a microdata, multiple attributes
are protected by multiplicative noises. This masking scenario is considered in Nayak et al. (2011)
and Lin and Wise (2012). In that case, the idea of the regression-attack proposed in Li and
Sarkar (2011) might be used to attack a noise-multiplied value. That is, to attack yij , which is
the original value of the i-th record on the j-th attribute, a data intruder may regress yij on other
∗
∗
∗
noise-multiplied values (yi1
, yi2
, · · · , yip
), where p is the number of regressors used to attack yij .
The idea could be explored in the future.
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